Cleveland State Law Review
Volume 13
Issue 2 Fraud and Deceit (A Symposium)

Article

1964

Non-Profit Associations as Legal Entities
Howard L. Oleck

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Recommended Citation
Howard L. Oleck, Non-Profit Associations as Legal Entities, 13 Clev.-Marshall L. Rev. 350 (1964)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For
more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.

Non-Profit Associations as Legal Entities
Howard L. Oleck*

U

long have been a problem to
the law. They are analogous to partnerships, and yet not
partnerships; analogous to corporations, and yet not corporations;
analogous to joint tenancies, and yet not joint tenancies; analogous to mutual agency, and yet not mutual agency.1 The most
baffling of all are the non-profit unincorporated associations.
Piecemeal attempts to make legal order and sense of these
organizations have not solved the basic question. Thus, statutes
requiring the filing of certificates of doing business under an as2
sumed name treat a symptom, not the problem itself.
Modern studies of the subject express the same bafflement as
did earlier studies, plus growing impatience with the slovenly
law that permits such uncertainty to continue so long. Recently,
for example, the application of constitutional rights to associations has involved the question of whether or not they are "persons" (i.e., "legal entities") for purposes of the privilege against
self-incrimination. 3 Certainly the drafters of the Constitution
could not foresee the modern proliferation of associations, both
incorporated and unincorporated.
NINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS

*Assoc.

Dean, Cleveland-Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.

1 Cousin v. Taylor, 115 Ore. 472, 239 P. 96, 41 A.L.R. 750 (1925); People v.

Herbert, 162 Misc. 817, 295 N. Y. S. 251 (1937); Blair v. Southern Clay Mfg.
Co., 173 Tenn. 571, 121 S. W. 2d 570 (1938); Stone v. Guth, 232 Mo. 217, 102 S.
W. 2d 738 (1937); Security-First Natl. Bank v. Cooper, 62 Cal. App. 2d 653,
145 P. 2d 722 (1943); and see, Wrightington, Unincorporated Assns. & Business Trusts (1923); 3 C. J. S., Agency, Sec. 259; Crane, Law of Partnership
537 (1952).

2 Bacon v. Gardner, 38 Wash. 2d 299, 229 P. 2d 523 (1951); Notes, 39 Yale
L. J. 874 (1930); 18 Calif. L. R. 707 (1930); Anno., L. R. A. 1915D, 982;
L. R. A. 1916D, 335; 45 A. L. R. 198 (1926); 59 A. L. R. 55 (1929).
3 See, Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations & Associations, c. 3 (1956). (Note
that a second edition of this book now is in preparation. It elaborates on
the non-profit association more than the first edition did, but finds little
more certainty about it now than existed years ago).
Confusion as to "entity" or "group of individuals" concepts was criticized recently in, Note, Constitutional Rights of Associations to Assert the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 112 U. Pa. L. R. 394 (1964), citing Hale
v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906) that associations are not "persons," and recent Supreme Court difficulties in cases involving unincorporated associations. Under the decision in, United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694, 700
(1944), associations again were denied the privilege available to "persons."
Hale v. Henkel's artificial separation of associations from their agents still
confuses decisions in self-incrimination cases, but seems consistent with the
trend towards "entity."

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1964

1

NON-PROFIT ASSOCIATION ENTITY

The truth is that some influential non-profit associations long
have vigorously fought attempts to give clear legal form and substance to unincorporated associations. They like "having it both
ways." It is very convenient to be able to be sometimes a legal
entity and sometimes not, sometimes a partnership and sometimes not-very convenient for the association (or its managers),
not so convenient for creditors, regulatory agencies, injured
members, or others affected by the will-o-the-wisp nature of the
association.
Straightforward legislative attempts to force associations to
settle into some specific form (e.g., corporate entity) have been
futile. Thus a Colorado statute requiring labor unions to incor
porate was held to be unconstitutional as an unlawful invasion
of "freedom of speech" and of "freedom of assembly." 4 This contrasts strangely with the common requirement that a national
bank, for example, must be a "body corporate," as must other
banks, insurance "companies," or public utilities. 5
A very recent appellate decision in Ohio, not yet reported
at the time of the writing of this note, has cast a beacon of light
through the legal fog called "the non-profit unincorporated association." This was the case of Miazga v. International Union of
Operating Engineers, A.F.L.-C.I.O., Local 18.6 Chief Justice Lee
E. Skeel, who wrote the opinion, is the same jurist who settled
the problem of advertised product liability with a razor sharp
decision not long ago. 7
In the Miazga case, the plaintiff and other members sued the
union (a non-profit unincorporated association) for damages for
defamation. The defense was the usual demurrer, based on the
usual argument that a member of an unincorporated association
is a co-principal in a joint enterprise, and thus in effect sues himself if he sues the association. The defense cited a long line of
cases so holding.
Judge Skeel pointed out that, since 1955, Ohio's statutes
American Federation of Labor v. Reilly, 113 Colo. 90, 155 P. 2d 145, 160
A. L. R. 873 (1944).
5 See, 1 Oleck, Modem Corporation Law, sec. 26 (1958), citing typical stat4

utes and cases.

6 196 N. E. 2nd 324 (Ohio Ct. of Appeals, 8th Dist., #26670, Opinion Feb. 14,

1964); Skeel writing the opinion; Silbert & Corrigan concurring.
Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., decided by Ohio Ct. Appeals, 8th
Dist., and affd. in 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N. E. 2d 612 (1958); see, Skeel, Product Warranty Liability, 6 Clev-Mar. L. R. 94 (1957); Holdridge, Advertised
Product Liability, 8 Clev-Mar. L. R. 14, 40 (1959).
7
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have provided that an unincorporated association may contract
or sue or be sued "as an entity" under its own name. 8 Such provisions now are found in many states.'
Ohio's statute seemingly permits execution only against the
assets of the association but has been interpreted otherwise, 0
while some statutes expressly permit execution also against assets
of members in some situations."
Judge Skeel then referred to the common law origin of the
theory of non-liability in the law of partnership. 12 He said that,
while this may be reasonable for small unincorporated associations, it is "completely outmoded" for a labor union consisting of
thousands of members."3
He then ruled that "such an association

. . .

should be

like any other corporate entity, held legally responsible as an
association in a proper case for injuries inflicted by its wrongful
acts not only to members of the public but to its members as
well." He pointed out that the use of the legal fiction of legal
entity of an organization has been, and still is, determined by
the courts rather than by legislative action, and that there is no
statutory provision to this effect even as to corporations in Ohio
or in most states. 14 Judicial control of the actions of private associations fills what otherwise would be a vacuum in the law."
So we have, at long last, in the Miazga decision, a clear and
direct judicial statement that a non-profit unincorporated assoOhio Rev. Code, Sec. 1745.01; Calif. Code Civ. Prac., Sec. 388; and see
Oleck, Non-Profit Corps. & Assns., sec. 20 (1956).
9 See, N. J. Stat. Anno., tit. 2A, c. 64; N. Y. C. P. L. & R., Sec. 1025; Okla.
Stat. Anno., tit. 12, Sec. 182.
10 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 1745.02 speaks only of execution against association
assets, but a recent case held that the statutory right to sue the "entity" is
one in addition to the right to hold the members of an unincorporated association (American Legion Post) personally liable: Lyons v. American Legion Post No. 650 Realty Co., 175 N. E. 2d 733 (Ohio 1961).
11 See statutes cited supra, n. 9. As to the federal view, that an association
is an entity for suit (venue, jurisdiction) purposes, but that tort liability
applies only to members generally, see, Sperry Products v. Assn. of Amer.
RR., 132 F. 2d 408 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. den. 63 S. Ct. 1031 (1942).
12 See, DeVillars v. Hessler, 363 Pa. 498, 70 A. 2d 333, 14 A. L. R. 2d 470
(1950); Anno., 14 A. L. R. 2d 473 (1950).
'3 See, Crane, Liability of Unincorporated Association for Tortious Injury
to a Member, 16 Vand. L. R. 319 (1963), citing Marshall v. International
Longshoremen's & W. Union, 57 Cal. 2d 781, 22 Cal. Rptr. 211, 371 P. 2d 987
(1962); and see Inglis v. Operating Engrs. Local Union No. 12, 18 Cal. Rptr.
187 (1962); affd. 23 Cal. Rptr. 403, 373 P. 2d 467 (1963).
14 Citing, 1 Oleck, Modern Corporation Law, c. 1, 2 (1958).
15 See, Note, Development in the Law: Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 Harv. L. R. 983 (1963).
8
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ciation is a legal entity, at least in the case of a fairly large
organization.
Prior efforts to solve the problem have employed various devices to fasten liability on unincorporated associations, such as
the concept of conspiracy. 16 Some courts have held a union to be
not liable for injury done by a member,"7 while others have held
it to be liable.18 Under federal labor law, unions are considered
to be legal entities; under bankruptcy law a non-profit association
may go into voluntary bankruptcy as an entity.1 9
Many states have applied to non-profit associations the coprincipal doctrine, which treats them as partnerships, imputing
negligence from one member to another, including the injured
member himself. 20 There is some logical basis for this only in the
case of a small organization, not in the case of a large one. 21 A
large group (Temple of the Mystic Shrine) was held to be liable
for an injury to a member not long ago. 22 In labor union cases
the doctrine has been invoked frequently in recent years.2 3
As to unions, the tendency has been to hold them liable for
intentional acts. 24 So, too, if a union owes a duty of representaWallick v. International Union of Elec., R. & M. W., 90 Ohio L. Abs. 584;
36 Ohio Bar (17) 584 (1963). Compare, Meriwether v. Atkin, 137 Mo. App.
32, 119 S. W. 36 (1909) which held an association not to be bound though its
members who acted might be; American Art Works v. Republican State
Committee, 177 Okla. 420, 60 P. 2d 786 (1936) political committee members
not liable; Magness v. Chicora Chapter, 193 So. Car. 205, 8 S. E. 2d 344
(1940) members held liable; Mitterhausen v. South Wisconsin Conference
Assn., 245 Wis. 353, 14 N. W. 2d 19 (1944) trustee-members held liable;
Note, Liability of Members and Officers of Non-Profit Associations for Contracts and Torts, 42 Calif. L. R. 812 (1954).
17 Benoit v. Amalgamated Local 229 U. E. R. M. W., 188 A. 2d 499 (Conn.
1963).
18 United Brotherhood of Carpenters & J. of Amer. v. Humphreys, 127 S. E.
2d 98 (Va. 1962).
19 See, Oleck, Non-Profit Corps. & Assns., sec. 20 (1956). Associations can
be taxed as corporations: see, Sarner, article, 20 N. Y. U. Inst. Fed. Tax.
609 (1962). And see, supra, n. 3, 9, 11.
20 Anno., 14 A. L. R. 2d 473 (1950); DeVillars v. Hessler, 363 Pa. 498, 70 A.
2d 333 (1950).
21 Crane, article, supra, n. 13. But in a small group (e.g., a 3 or 5 man
partnership) the individual members deny association (partnership) status
too, when that is inconvenient; as in refusal of workmen's compensation
coverage to an injured employee of a partnership of farmers, in, Campos v.
Jomoi, 122 N. W. 2d 473 (Neb. 1963).
22 Thomas v. Dunne, 131 Colo. 20, 279 P. 2d 427 (1955).
23 Crane, article, supra, n. 13; Marchitto v. Central R. Co. of N. J., 9 N. J.
456, 88 A. 2d 851 (1952).
24 International Assn. of Machinists v. Gonzales, 78 S. Ct. 923, 256 U. S. 617,
2 L. Ed. 2d 1018 (1958); Morton v. Local 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, & Helpers Union, 200 F. Supp. 653 (D. C. Ohio, 1962) awarded punitive damages.
16
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tion to a member; 25 but not if a matter of business judgment is
28
involved.
All this backing and filling has been of small help to anyone
but the professional managers of unincorporated non-profit associations. Beyond question, labor unions have been the chief beneficiaries of this legal uncertainty-more specifically, professional
labor union managers. In essence, they have claimed the benefits
of unincorporated (partnership) form while operating organizations larger than most corporations, and denied the liabilities
appropriate to large organizations which are more truly "management controlled" than are most large corporations.
The writer of this note does not view a "professionally operated" organization as entitled to the same tolerance that one gives
to small groups of amateurs who try to carry on charitable or
social or educational work pro bono publico.
Such views are not anti-labor. The same views would apply
to abuse by business corporation management or any other holders of power. Power is respectable only if combined with responsibility.
The Miazga case, and its conclusion that at least the larger
unincorporated non-profit associations shall be treated as legal
entities, is wise and sound. This view will require clarification
of the status of officers, trustees and members, vis-a-vis each
other and vis-a-vis third persons. The constitutional problem of
privilege of an association against self-incrimination is a good
example of the problems involved even as to incorporated associations.2 7 It is now to be settled whether or not corporate norms
or some other standards shall be applied to internal and external
relations of unincorporated non-profit associations. But at least
the deliberate abuse, by powerful organizations and their managers, of a legal concept meant only for small, amateur-operated
clubs now should be ended.
25 Fray v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, etc., 9 Wis. 2d 631, 101 N. W. 2d 782
(1960). But no duty was required in Marshall v. International Longshoremen's & W. Union, Local 6, 57 Cal. 2d 781, 22 Cal. Rptr. 211, 371 P. 2d 987

(1962).

26 Finnegan v. Penna. R. Co., 76 N. J. Super. 71, 183 A. 2d 779 (1962); but
see (no special duty involved) Marshall case, supra, n. 25.
27 See comments, supra, n. 3.
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